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Australia’s attitude towards ASEAN has waxed and waned over recent decades, including 
in higher education. In part a reflection of tensions between its geography and history, it 
highlighted the question of the extent to which Australia saw itself as an Asian country 
(an uncertainty shared by number of its ASEAN neighbours). Reviewing changes in 
several key indices (Asian languages strategy, International student policy, Education as 
Aid), the prospects for a regional knowledge network comprising Australia, ASEAN and 
China are assessed, with the conclusion that the whole would be greater than the sum of 
the parts, but that for the prospect to be realised, greater consistency in Australian 
government policy towards the region is needed.  
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Your economic ties have increased, your political ties have increased, 
but to be part of the family, you must develop the social side, the people 
to people side and that's been limited (Lee, Kuan Yew) 
The complex relations between ASEAN and Australia have evolved substantially over the 
40 years since Australian became an ASEAN dialogue partner in 1974. No less so in 
higher education, which has been the most dynamic sub-sector within ASEAN-Australia 
relations in education, accounting for both the bulk of educational mobility, as well as 
most educational cooperation (Fraser, Simkin and Wright 1994). Drawing on the author’s 
longstanding involvement with higher education in the ASEAN region, the analytic lens 
focuses on higher education relations, as one window on the evolution of Australia’s 
relations with ASEAN, over the period 1974-2014. Given that the 10 ASEAN systems 
present too wide a window, the article’s gaze is largely restricted to 5 key ASEAN 
member states (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam), encompassing 
both the world’s largest majority-Muslim nation, as well as a range of levels of 
development, and political ideologies. For comparative purposes, Singapore, something 
of an outlier within ASEAN, is treated in notes to the some of the tables, and some 
reference is also made to China, for reasons that become clearer towards the latter part of 
the argument.  
Overall, the argument is made that, while progress has indeed been made on ASEAN-
Australia relations over the period, notably in higher education, the rise of China, and its 
higher education and research system has changed the equation for both, opening up 
opportunities for greater regional academic relations, in which the whole would form 
more than the sum of the parts. While as Jayasuriya and others have pointed out, regional 
architecture is as yet less well defined within the Asia-Pacific, and specifically ASEAN, 
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relative to the more mature and well-developed regional programmes and relations in the 
European Union, it is argued that there is considerable, if as yet somewhat under-explored, 
potential to extend and deepen regional relations in higher education, both between 
ASEAN and Australia. If one accepts Dent’s distinction between inter-regionalism and 
trans-regionalism (Dent 2003), and the implications of Jules, and Jayasuria’s work on 
open regionalism it would be true to say that signs of the latter, indicated by common 
spaces and associated ASEAN-Australia networks between individuals, and 
organisations, are still maturing in higher education and research (Jayasuriya 2003, 2004, 
Jules 2014) – but have nonetheless grown significantly in density and significance.   
A genuine, deeply rooted trans-regional network of higher education and research 
relations between Australia and ASEAN, while important, is still at a more embryonic 
stage, and, while both ASEAN’s and Australia’s achievements on regionalism tend to be 
outweighed by their rhetoric, China’s dramatic rise presents new opportunities to extend 
regional knowledge networks (Welch 2010b, 2011, 2012c, 2012d). Given this importance 
of China to each, the latter part of the analysis thus also explores the potential for a wider 
regionalism that embraces China’s dynamic higher education and research system. The 
prospects offered by a tripartite regionalism (ASEAN, Australia, China) are considered in 
the final sections of the analysis.   
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE: ASEAN-AUSTRALIA RELATIONS SINCE 1974 
The past 40 years, since Australia became ASEAN’s first dialogue partner in 1974, has 
been witness to an evolving set of relations, notably including education (AusAID 2004, 
Chin and Richardson 2004). In turn, this needs to be set against the rich and multi-faceted 
intra-ASEAN diversity, including religious, cultural and linguistic diversity, both within 
and between ASEAN member states, and levels of development, from wealthy, 
technologically highly-developed nations such as Singapore, to very poor developing 
nations such as Laos and Myanmar.   
Table 1.     Development Indicators, Selected SE Asian states.  
COUNTRY HDI 
1990 
HDI 
2011 
HDI 
Rank 
2011 
Net Primary 
Enrolment 
2001-2009 
M   and   F 
GDP per 
capita 
(PPP$) 
2010 
Public 
Expenditure 
on Ed’n 
(% of GDP) 
Adult 
Literacy 
Rates 
2001-
2009 
 M and F 
Indonesia 0.481 0.543 124 94          97 3,880 2.8    (2010) 89      95 
Malaysia 0.720 0.793 61 95          95 13,186 5.1     (2010) 90      95 
Philippines 0.571 0.644 112 89          88 3,560 2.7     (2009) 96      95 
Thailand 0.707 0.768 103 89          90 7,672  5.8     (2011) 92      96 
Viet Nam 0.610 0.691 128 ..          .. 2,875  6.6     (2010) 91      95 
UNDP 2012: 217-226, World Bank (n.d.)  
Note: Singapore’s HDI in 2010 was 26; Australia’s was 2, China’s was 101.   
The extent to which Australia has come to see itself as an Asian country (FitzGerald 
1997),  - albeit a quite distinctive one – marks a further arena of change, as well as how 
much that view is shared by its ASEAN neighbours. The decades from the mid-1970s 
arguably revealed Australia moving on from its past self-understanding as an outpost of 
British empire, together with a sense of regional insecurity (Beeson 2001, Welch 2013), 
towards a more systematic engagement with the region. Most recently, the major Australia 
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in the Asian Century White Paper, launched in 2012 by then Prime Minister Gillard, 
identified Indonesia as one of a handful of priority countries, (and four languages), for 
which a country strategy paper was then devised (DFAT Indonesia Profile, DFAT 2013). 
The White Paper, including its educational dimensions, was announced as a major 
initiative, although experienced regional analysts argued that Australia had been here 
before – repeatedly – and that the paper was best seen as yet one more chapter in 
Australia’s waxing and waning relations with ASEAN, and engagement with Asia more 
generally.  
What follows represents much more than a simple expansion of ASEAN-Australia 
relations in education. The initial stage, characterised by the Colombo Plan, occurred in 
an era of post-colonial development for much of developing South East Asia. At the time, 
a hierarchy of development between ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ nations was commonly 
assumed by Western theorists (although the specific terms and the theoretical implications 
were by no means universally employed), the Cold War set limits to cultural ties, 
including student and staff mobility, and functionalist assumptions of a uni-linear model 
of development based on modernisation theory were only gradually being superseded by 
more complex frameworks (Welch 1985).  Higher education in the region was generally 
under-developed, with local factors such as Viet Nam’s longstanding war (which, 
although Australia had established diplomatic relations with Ha Noi in 1973, only finally 
ending in 1975). Malaysia’s ethnic discrimination against non-Bumiputras1, and 
Myanmar’s decades-long isolation and neglect of higher education were further examples 
that limited access and opportunity. (Welch 2011a, ADB 2012, ADB 2013).   
Forty years later, much had changed. Although, in education, three issues - Asian 
Languages, Overseas Students, and Educational Aid – show striking continuity over the 
period, by the 21st. century the context had altered considerably. Perhaps the most 
dramatic change was the global shift to Asia, including in higher education - an 
acknowledgement that the region had evolved into the most dynamic in the world, with 
some stellar levels of development present, including among ASEAN member states 
(SCMP 2013, DFAT 2012a, Bhandari and Lefebure 2015, RIE 2015).   
The changes … mark a significant shift in the global economy towards 
Asia … pinpointing it as the centre of gravity of the world’s economic 
mass (OECD 2010: 26).  
While three giant economies, China, India and Japan, would lead Asia’s resurgence, other 
large countries like Indonesia and Vietnam would also have significant economic mass. 
Even Thailand and Malaysia could have economies larger than France has today (OECD 
2010: 23).    
Singapore had taken its place among the wealthiest league of nations, while the dragon in 
the room, China, had thrust its way on to the world stage so emphatically, that both 
ASEAN and Australia each paid more attention to China than each other. Such changes 
had barely been dreamed of, four decades earlier (Lee 2015).    
                                                 
1 Bumiputras refers to ethnic Malays, who are comprise around 60 per cent of the total 
population, and in practice still gain preference in education and employment, despite quotas in 
education being formally abandoned in 2003.  
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Values constituted a second change element. International education had traditionally 
been based on the twin pillars of goodwill and development, as the authors of a 
contemporary review of Australia’s international education highlighted: “Australia’s 
educational assistance to overseas students aims to export both goodwill and people who 
can solve problems” (Cleverley and Jones, 1976: 31, Megarrity 2005, 2008). In theory 
this benefitted both sides, if not always equally in practice. The developing nations of 
Southeast Asia benefitted from capacity development, in the form of scholarships from 
wealthy Australia, although some concerns were already being expressed about whether 
the content of such programmes was always appropriate (Cleverley and Jones 1976, Toh 
and Farrelly 1982). Awardees, who as a condition of their scholarship needed to return to 
their homeland upon completion (and mostly did), brought back much-needed skills, and 
often went on to gain leadership positions, not just in education. Australia benefitted from 
the regional goodwill that such schemes engendered. The last three decades or so, 
however, marked the growth of a much more commercial imperative in international 
education, notably in Australia, but more recently also evident in ASEAN member states 
such as Singapore and Malaysia. (Altbach and Welch 2010, Welch 2011a and b, 2012, 
MoE Malaysia 2015). International education is now commonly conceived of as an 
‘industry’, with an estimated total value globally of more than US$2 trillion. The Asia-
Pacific region is the most dynamic growth centre of this industry, as is seen below, and 
Australia is only one competitor for students from the region.  
A third change element was the character of Australian immigration which, at the onset 
of the period, had barely seen the end of discriminatory migration policies that limited 
settlement prospects for ASEAN-origin students. But by the 21st century, a strong policy 
shift towards skilled migration led to the fact that around half of Australia’s applicants for 
permanent residence were being drawn from its own international students, many of 
whom still stemmed from the ASEAN region (Welch 2013, p. 120). (More recent policy 
changes made it more difficult for international students to remain in Australia, after 
graduation). Indeed, migration from ASEAN member states rose from 10 per cent of the 
total intake in 1982-3, to 20 per cent in 2002-3 (APH 2005). This, too, however was not 
entirely new: the Goldring report of 1984 had confirmed that some 75 per cent of private 
international students gained permanent residence in the 1970s (Meadows 2011, p. 61).  
Australia’s shift to Asia had marked effects. By 2011, ASEAN-Australia two-way trade 
had reached US$88 billion (DFAT 2012a), with an imbalance towards ASEAN evident 
with respect to both goods, and services. Of Australian service sector exports, education 
was now the most significant, and within education, higher education formed the major 
component. Underpinning this development was the rise of the Asian middle class, 
including in ASEAN. Across the Asia-Pacific, the middle class totalled 525 million in 
2009, representing 28 per cent of the global total. Projections were that by 2020 this would 
have increased more than threefold, to 1.74 billion individuals and 54 per cent of the world 
total. By 2030, the same projection indicated almost 3.3 billion, or 66 per cent of the 
global total middle class (OECD 2010: 28). Although China and India will form a big part 
of that growth, the growing middle class in ASEAN member states such as Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Viet Nam will be also be important.  
Three features form the basis for further growth in academic relations between ASEAN 
and Australia. First is the common aim by ASEAN member states to develop at least a 
top tier of ‘world class’ universities, within a wider context of subscribing to the discourse 
of knowledge based economy as the means towards development. Second is the South 
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East Asian middle class’s propensity to save and invest in education, seeking out desirable 
destinations and higher education institutions (HEIs) for their children. Third is the growth 
of ASEAN migrant communities in Australia, among which many individuals are well 
educated and interested to form and strengthen knowledge bridges with their countries of 
origin. The combination of these three offer considerable potential to expand two-way 
flows of both students and academics between Australia and ASEAN. The desire to build 
top-tier research universities has already issued in substantial initiatives across the region 
and has been an important element in the development of a more multi-polar world of 
knowledge (Royal Society 2011, Welch 2011a, 2011b, 2012b, 2013b). It is argued that 
the extension of this trend in the region will underpin more extensive and intensive 
academic relations between ASEAN and Australia in the decades to come, based on a 
richer, denser, more egalitarian mode of regional relations.  
KEY THEMES AND THEIR EVOLUTION.  
As indicated above, a striking continuity of themes that underpin Australia’s regional 
relations with ASEAN in the education field is evident over the period 1974-2014, notably 
in the trinity of Asian languages, Education as Aid, and International students. By the end 
of the era, a fourth theme of academic collaboration was becoming much more prominent, 
as the data below indicate. The following section outlines the evolution of these themes.   
Asian languages 
As early as the mid-1970s, Asian languages were already listed as a growth area 
(Cleverley and Jones 1976: 13-15). The Auchmuty Report of 1970 gave a major stimulus 
(pushed in part by Australian business who were concerned, then as now, at inadequacies 
in Asia literacy among young Australians), and the growth of economic and cultural ties 
to Asia and ASEAN (Auchmuty 1970). The report stimulated something of a move 
towards Asian languages, including Indonesian. The Asian Studies Coordinating 
Committee, for example, established by the Australian Education Council in 1972, made 
grants available for the development of new curricula. As a result, the Intercultural Studies 
Project of the University of Sydney developed Social Studies materials for Indonesia and 
Malaysia, while Flinders University supplemented its existing specialist Indonesian staff 
(Cleverley and Jones 1976:15).   
Asian languages were a striking omission from Jones’ later coverage of Australia’s 
international relations (Jones 1986). The relative growth and decline of Asian languages, 
however, shines an interesting light on Australia’s regional relations, including with 
ASEAN. The most recent iteration, enshrined in the Australia in the Asian Century 
document, designated 4 languages as priorities: Chinese, Hindi, Indonesian, and Japanese 
(DFAT 2012b). Enrolments in Indonesian studies and Indonesian language, and the fate 
of departments of Indonesian in Australian universities are perhaps the most apposite 
example. Despite various versions of an Asian language strategy (Welch 2013: 102), some 
less well-financed than others, and the longstanding Australia-Indonesia Institute founded 
in 1989, one of whose aims is “the encouragement of the study of the Indonesian language 
and culture in Australia and the English language and Australian culture in Indonesia”, 
(DFAT Australia-Indonesia), a longstanding pattern of advance and retreat is evident, at 
both national and institutional levels, rather than substantial policy continuity. The 
Building Relationships through Intercultural Dialogue and Engagement (BRIDGE) 
program (Indonesia), designed to foster Asia literacy and inter-cultural understanding 
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between the two nations, is one initiative, that supported Indonesian language programs 
in Australian schools, for example, but the Myer Foundation funds on which it in part 
depends, lapsed at the end of 2012.  
Cuts to tertiary education funding, inadequate weighting of languages in tertiary entrance 
scales, and the well-known resistance of the Anglosphere to learn other languages, have 
all played their role. But policy discontinuity has also helped contribute to an outcome 
whereby enrolments in Indonesian at tertiary level actually declined in recent years, 
despite the rising importance of Indonesia in world terms, and growing ties with Australia 
in particular (DFAT Indonesia Profile). Even the existence of the Australia Indonesia 
Youth Exchange, founded 30 years ago, which offers young Australians the chance to live 
in Indonesia, failed to halt the decline. Nor did a tenfold increase in the working holiday 
visa scheme (from 100 to 1000), announced in 2012, that was designed to encourage 
people from each country to experience the other’s cultures. The number of students 
enrolled in Indonesian at Australian education institutions actually declined by 40 per cent 
over the last decade (DFAT Indonesia Profile, Jakarta Post 2013, Asia Education 
Foundation 2013, Henderson, 2011). Despite Indonesian again being listed as a priority 
language within the Australia in the Asian Century White Paper, the decline is unlikely to 
be reversed, unless systematic, long-term priority is attached to the issues listed above. 6 
universities closed their Indonesian language programmes between 2004 and 2013, 
leaving only 15 that retained the language; the programme at La Trobe was only saved 
after concerted action in both countries (Jakarta Post, 2013). Nor is it likely that, without 
significant institutional and governmental incentives, the numbers of Australian students 
studying the language in Indonesia will rise much, despite efforts by organisations such 
as the Asia Education Foundation, and relevant university departments around the country 
(AITSL 2013).  
The incoming coalition Federal government’s much-touted Colombo Plan, announced in 
2012, was a tangible recognition of the global ‘Shift to the East’. While a welcome 
initiative, predicated on a more two-way approach to mobility, it was acknowledged as 
limited - only supporting perhaps 300 students to study in the region (Liberal Party 2013). 
Of these, only a minority would study within ASEAN universities. Further information 
released in late 2013 indicated that, in a pilot programme beginning in 2014, 10 students 
would be selected on merit from each of four priority nations (Indonesia, Singapore, Hong 
Kong [China] and Japan) to study for two semesters at an Australian university. $4 million 
was also devoted to support 700 Australian students to study for one or two semesters in 
the selected countries, and additional students for short-term placements (Australian 
2013f and g). Overall funding for the New Colombo Plan was set at $100 million over 5 
years (Australian 2013g). Emphases were gaining work experience while studying; 
boosting Australian productivity and innovation; and enhancing regional integration. The 
Foreign Minister’s stated overall goal, a mix of cultural and economic rationales, largely 
focused on the benefits to Australia: 
My goal is to see study in the Indo-Pacific region become a rite of 
passage. Through living in the region, learning languages, forging 
friendships and exchanging ideas, young Australians will return home 
with the skills and perspectives to support our growth in a changing 
world (Australian, 2013g).  
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Educational Aid 
Aid in education has been another enduring element (AusAID 2004). The announcement 
in 1972 of a review of Australia’s aid, the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs’ Report on 
Australia’s Foreign Aid, was the first such review since the establishment of the Colombo 
Plan in 1950. It marked a significant change from the preceding Cold War mentality, 
which had viewed Australian aid in large part as a bulwark against Communism. In a year 
that saw Australia establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, and 
withdraw its troops from Viet Nam, the charter for the later review was set by an 
incoming, reformist Prime Minister: “to ensure that (Australian aid) has a more direct 
bearing on improving the quality of life of …fellow human beings” (Cleverley and Jones 
1976, p. 22). In practice, despite changing federal governments, aid, including in 
education, continued to be seen as an extension of foreign affairs policy.  
Isolating specific education components among the overall Australian aid envelope has 
never been simple, particularly when programmes previously deemed education are, as a 
result of shifting government priorities, sometimes simply re-badged as good governance 
or transparency training. Nonetheless, it was estimated that education comprised around 
17 per cent of bi-lateral aid in the mid-1970s (Cleverley and Jones 1976, p. 26).  
Indonesia again presents a good case study of evolving relations. Australian aid to 
Indonesia, which began in the 1950s, totalled $574 million in 2012-13. Currently the 
largest recipient of Australian aid, the sectoral breakdown of total ODA to Indonesia in 
2005-6 revealed that 47 per cent of the ongoing Indonesia program (thus excluding the 
Australia Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development (AIPRD) was 
devoted to education, largely comprising support for Madrasahs (the Learning Assistance 
Program for Islamic Schools [LAPIS]), and Australian Development Scholarships [ADS] 
(Australian Government 2005-6, ABC 2008, Jakarta Post 2013). Of Indonesia’s 68,000 
Madrasahs, Australia has supported 1,500, to the tune of $47 million (Australian 2013a). 
Selecting only those that teach the agreed national curriculum, four AusAID programmes 
enhanced the capacity of Madrasahs to meet national accreditation standards: enhanced 
teacher training, increased learning and teaching mechanisms, meeting the national 
curriculum standard, and improved infrastructure and facilities.  
The aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami, saw Australia initiate a $1 billion aid package, 
comprising $500 million in grant assistance and a further $500 million under a highly 
concessional loan programme. The AIPRD programme contained significant educational 
components, including 600 scholarships, a doubling of the previous number.  
…AusAID funding provided for … Indonesian students, as well as other 
scholarships and education assistance, such as for postgraduates 
studying in Australia. This includes … international students studying 
in Australia (Jakarta Post 2013).  
It also included a component, the Indonesia–Australia Specialised Training Program, to 
deliver over 325 short courses over the years 2004 to 2008. The programme focussed on 
capacity building for mid-career professionals in areas such as economic management, 
governance, and improving delivery of basic services in health and education.  (Australian 
Government 2005-6). The subsequent re-integration of AusAID into the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in September 2013, was paralleled by a cut of some 
12 per cent to Australia’s aid budget (from $5.66 billion to $5.004 billion), and a ‘more 
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Jakarta, less Geneva’ affirmation of regionalism, which was likely to see Australia’s 
regional aid to its neighbours preserved, over existing programmes in places further afield, 
such as Afghanistan and Africa (Australian, 2013b, c, and d).  
International Student Mobility 
International student policy is the arena that has attracted the greatest media and popular 
attention, both nationally and internationally. By the mid-1970s, international students 
already comprised a mix of private and sponsored students, although a degree of policy 
uncertainty attended the former, a decade or so before the twin official reviews of 
international education eventuated in a major policy re-orientation (ACE 1989, Megarrity 
2005, 2008). In 1974-5, of 2780 awardees under the Colombo Plan, Indonesia was 
awarded 428 Australian scholarships, Malaysia 455, Singapore 224, Thailand 331, and 
South Viet Nam 422 – a sub-total of 1,860, or 67 per cent of the scheme’s total. This 
pattern paralleled the changing mix of Australian migration, at a time just after the final 
abandonment of its historically discriminatory, ‘White Australia’ policy. The reasons 
advanced to account for this trend underlined the growth of Australia’s regional relations 
in education: 
First, more attention is being focused on Asian and South Pacific 
countries. Of … importance has been Australia’s admittance to the 
South East Asia Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO) in 
1973, and to the Asian Regional Group of UNESCO in 1974…, 
accompanied by significant increases in regional activity (Cleverley and 
Jones 1976: 27, see also UNSW n.d.) 
A singular exception to regionalism, at least temporarily, stemmed from the ending of the 
Vietnam War, which abruptly halted sponsorship of students from that country. But 
overall, this trend of a disproportionate number of international students in the Australian 
system stemming from the region, was early evidence of what would prove to be an 
enduring pattern, although in the last decade or more, China has grown to be by far the 
largest source country, while most recently numbers from India have risen rapidly.  
The number of private students also grew, encouraged inter alia, by the federal 
government’s recent abolition of fees for university study (1974), although a cap of 10,000 
private overseas students had been introduced in 1973 (Meadows 2011, p. 61, UNSW 
n.d.). In addition, the federal government’s decision to allow ‘successful’ private students 
who wished to remain in Australia, and who met normal migration criteria, to remain, 
induced some students to stay. The decision was not without controversy however: 
Singapore protested that it promoted brain drain, and attempted to restrict its students to 
the sponsored category (Cleverley and Jones 1976: 29, see also Meadows 2011, p. 61). 
The cap was later removed, and an overseas student charge (OSC) introduced, with the 
level depending on the course. International student policy continued to frame Australia’s 
foreign policy objectives that were stated by the architect of one of the two reviews to be: 
… the advancement of Australia’s interests in countries of particular 
importance to Australia (especially ASEAN…) by improving 
communication, understanding of and sympathy for Australia’s policies, 
and to promote cultural exchange (Goldring 1984, p. 29). 
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Table 2. ASEAN Private Overseas Students, Post-Secondary & Higher Education, 1976-
1984.  
Country 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Indonesia 490 538 514 488 423 365 371 593 943 
Malaysia 3,139 3,094 3,123 3,580 4,001 4,619 5,353 6,016 7,341 
Philippines 28 28 27 23 17 18 17 26 30 
Thailand 258 270 257 241 214 191 170 151 152 
Viet Nam N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Other Asia 396 361 345 394 366 419 428 449 559 
TOTAL 5,486 5,852 6,004 6,745 7,383 8,103 9,125 10,656 13,047 
Adapted from Jones 1986, Pp. 75-6.  
Note: ‘Post-Secondary’ includes TAFE qualifications.  
The transition to international (higher) education becoming an industry was precipitated 
by the outcomes of the dual Goldring, and Jackson, reports of 1984 (Goldring 1984, 
Jackson 1984, Meadows 2011). The two reports came to opposite conclusions. Goldring 
recommended maintaining the cap on international students (due to the limited capacity 
of the Australian education system) and subsidies - a public affirmation of Australia’s 
contribution to international education development (Goldring 1984, p. 55). At the time, 
this cap proposed at 5 to 10 per cent of undergraduate enrolments, with no more than 25 
per cent in any single course. By contrast, Jackson argued that Australian international 
education was both cumbersome and staid, and called for the existing Overseas Student 
Charge (OSC) to be steadily increased, so that by the mid-1990s, overseas students would 
be levied the full costs of their education (Jackson 1984, p. 95).  
The subsequent inter-departmental committee, established to reconcile the two divergent 
sets of recommendations, supported a modified version of the Goldring report. Policy 
developments, however, veered very much in the other direction - towards crafting 
international education into an industry, that is now Australia’s largest single service 
sector export, and one of the country’s most substantial industries overall (Meadows 2011, 
Welch 2012a). Throughout the 1990s and beyond, international student numbers 
continued to mushroom, with totals rising from 84,000 in 1993, to almost 160,000 in 1999. 
Of this total, higher education occupied 53.4 per cent, including a growing proportion of 
offshore enrolments. By 1999, offshore enrolments comprised 16.9 per cent of overall 
enrolments (onshore added a further 36.5 per cent) (AEI 1999). The rise of online 
education and the establishment of branch campuses, including Monash Malaysia and 
RMIT Viet Nam, accelerated the growing proportion of offshore enrolments (Welch 2007, 
2011a, 2012b). By 2011, enrolments in higher education totalled 242,351 (AEI 2011), of 
which China accounted for over a quarter. Australian outbound students totalled a mere 
11,000 in 2009, among which no ASEAN member state was among the top five 
destinations, while Malaysia was the only ASEAN member state among the top 5 source 
countries, by visa application granted (ABS 2011). 2013 data revealed that, of the 228, 
263 international students enrolled in Australian higher education, China accounted for 
40.2 per cent of the total, although Viet Nam and Malaysia were among the top 5 source 
countries overall (Austrade 2013). ASEAN member states formed a significant share of 
total higher education student visas granted in 2013, as the following table indicates.  
Table 3.  Higher Education (573) Visas Granted, Australia 2013, by Country 
Country Visas Granted % 
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Indonesia 3,793 3.0 
Malaysia 6,027 4.7 
Philippines 1,500 (?) 1.2 
Thailand 3,416 2.7 
Viet Nam 7,849 6.2 
China 44,809 35.2 
Source: Dept. of Immigration 2013 
Note: Numbers comprise both onshore and offshore. Singapore visas granted numbered 
3,148.  
The data in Table 3 show that the 5 ASEAN member states together total about half of the 
Chinese total (17.8 per cent of the total international enrolment, compared to China’s 35.2 
per cent).  
A REGIONAL KNOWLEDGE NETWORK? 
By 2011, the longstanding disparities of Australia-ASEAN student flows were painfully 
apparent. Indonesia again forms a useful example. Almost 18,000 Indonesian students 
were enrolled in Australia, mostly in higher education. The reverse flow was barely a 
fraction of that total, estimated at no more than 200, most of whom were undertaking short 
language courses, rather than degree programmes. Australian students enrolled in degree 
programmes at Indonesian universities totalled no more than 50, and although the 
incoming federal government’s announcement of the New Colombo Plan promised to 
boost this number (see above), it would do little to reduce the gap (Politifact 2013).   
But the ongoing development of universities and R&D in ASEAN countries, motivated 
by a ubiquitous regional desire to boost knowledge and innovation, together with the 
thousands of well-trained graduates from Australian universities, who have returned home 
and now occupy senior posts within universities, business and government, have created 
a platform for building a regional knowledge network, which remains as yet, 
underdeveloped. Singapore’s major investment in research and development (R & D), and 
forging leading universities, has led to both its National University of Singapore (NUS) 
and the Nanyang Technological University (NTU) being ranked strongly in the reputable 
and robust Shanghai Jiaotong Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) list. 
Malaysia’s University of Malaya, which has benefited from being one of 5 Malaysian 
university to be designated a research university, and the only university to be selected for 
the High Impact Research initiative, is also listed. Both systems have made major progress 
in becoming Eduhubs, attracting talent from throughout the region, and beyond.2  
But for this regional knowledge network to operate effectively, two things would be 
needed. The first is Australia’s long-term, bi-partisan national policy commitment to the 
goal of building such a regional network, which would survive being overturned by the 
next change of government. The second is a much more serious commitment by 
Australian universities to the long-term cultivation of their graduates who return to 
ASEAN countries, but who are often interested in maintaining and deepening knowledge 
partnerships with Australia, and who are often in senior posts, in government, universities 
or industry. Currently, Australian universities seem more interested in the potential of 
                                                 
2 Malaysia in particular, has set out, with considerable success, to recruit students from other 
Muslim countries and cultures, both from the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa.  
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alumni for fund raising, than making a long-term commitment to maintaining close 
contacts, and sustaining trans-national knowledge communities.  
Prospects for fostering a regional knowledge network also bear on the quality and research 
output of regional higher education systems. What contribution does higher education 
make to research and development in ASEAN member states, and how does this compare 
with the developed world in general, and Australia in particular? What are the outputs in 
terms of publications, citations, and patents? And what evidence is there of existing bi-
lateral research collaboration between Australia and ASEAN members? The following 
tables provide much of the data that enables answers to these questions.  
Table 4.  Contribution to R&D Performance by Sector 
Country / 
Region 
Business Government  Higher 
Education 
SE Asia 51.3 22.1 15.7 
Indonesia 14.3 81.1 4.6. 
Malaysia 65.3 20.3 14.4 
Philippines -- -- -- 
Thailand 43.9 22.5 31.0 
Viet Nam -- -- -- 
China 62.4  27.1 10.5 
Developed Country 
Average 
62.9 13.3 27.0 
Sources: ADB 2008:122, ADB 2012; India estimates from UNESCO 2010b: 488. 
Note: Singapore data: Business 63.8, Government 10.9, Higher Education 25.4 
Table 4 reveals that for South East Asia in general and for the 5 ASEAN member states 
in particular, higher education contributes no more than about half of the developed world 
average, to total research and development (R&D) performance. A significant outlier, 
Singapore, treated in the note to Table 4, reveals a profile much more like the developed 
world average.  
Table 5.  R&D Expenditure Levels and as Percentage of GDP, 2002 and 2009  
R & D spending, 2002 R&D as percent of GDP 
Country $ Billions 
(PPP) 
Percent of 
World 
1992 2009 
Indonesia 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.05 
Malaysia 1.5 0.2 0.4 0.64 
Philippines 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.12 
Thailand 1.1 0.1 0.2 0.25 
Viet Nam Na Na Na 0.19 
China 72.0 8.7 0.8 1.2 
Australia -- -- -- 2.06 
UNESCO 2010: 438. World Bank 2006 
− = data unavailable, GDP = gross domestic product, PPP = purchasing power parity, 
PRC = People’s Republic of China, R&D = research and development. 
Singapore’s rate of R&D as % of GDP in 2002 was 2.2, and in 2009 2.52.  
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Table 5 reveals that none of the 5 ASEAN member states either spend more than 0.64 of 
a percent of GDP on research and development, compared to Australia’s 2.06, itself no 
more than average in OECD terms. Again, Singapore is the ASEAN outlier, as the notes 
to Table 5 reveal, while China’s rapidly rising investment now outstrips that of all 5 
ASEAN states, but not Singapore.  
 
Table 6.  Knowledge Economy Index, and related indices, 2012, Selected Countries, 2012 
Country Overall 
World 
Rank 
Knowledge 
Economy 
Knowledge 
Index 
Innovation  Education 
Australia 9 8.88 8.98 8.92 9.71 
Indonesia 108 3.11 2.99 3.24 3.20 
Malaysia 48 6.1 6.25 6.91 5.22 
Philippines 92 3.94 3.81 3.77 4.64 
Thailand 66 5.21 5.25 5.95 4.23 
Viet Nam 104 3.40 3.60 2.75 2.99 
China 84 4.37 4.57 5.99 3.93 
Source: World Bank KEI and KI index, 2012 
Note: Singapore’s overall world rank is 23, with a KEI rating of 8.26  
The knowledge economy profile of the 5 ASEAN states in Tables 4, 5 and 6 above reveal 
significant, albeit differential disparities between Australia and the five selected ASEAN 
member states, on current knowledge indices. But the gaps are narrowing. Over the decade 
1998-2008, for example, the number of articles published by Australian researchers rose 
from 16,432, to 28,313, a growth rate of 72.3 per cent. By contrast, Indonesia’s rate of 
growth over the same period, (off a much lower base, to be sure) was 113 per cent, 
Malaysia’s was 312 per cent, Philippines’ 137 per cent, Thailand’s 383 and Viet Nam’s 
341, although the same is not true for numbers of USPTO registered patents (UNESCO 
2010: 441 and 444, see also Welch 2010b and c). Data on China, whose recent dramatic 
scientific rise is transforming the global knowledge network, is included for reasons 
outlined below (Royal Society 2011, UNESCO 2010, OECD 2008, Yang and Welch 
2012). A long-term view, therefore would suggest that extending regional collaboration 
networks is worthwhile.    
And there is already a base to build on. Table 7 below, reveals significant existing 
academic collaboration between Australia and the 5 ASEAN member states, when 
measured over the first decade of the 21st century. China, too, is now a major knowledge 
partner for Australia (Chief Scientist 2013). In an era of Network Science, where the 
proportion of publications by authors from more than one country rose from 25 per cent 
to 35 per cent over the past two decades, it further underlines the tangible benefits beyond 
the actual research produced.  The data in Table 7 reveal that several bi-literal 
collaborations (Thailand, Philippines, Viet Nam and China) produce a moderate lift in 
citation rates, something pointed to by other studies of international collaboration (Royal 
Society 2011, Australian 2012). While Singapore, something of an ASEAN outlier on 
many levels, is not included in the table, the data reveals that extending existing research 
collaboration between Australia and Singapore would tend to produce similar effects.   
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Table 7. Australia’s Collaborative Publications and Citations 2000-2011, by Country 
Country Total 
Publications 
2000-2011 
Total Citations 
2000-2011 
Citations 
per publication 
Australia 512,042 5,801,020 11.4 
- with China 18,465 256,584 13.9 
- with Indonesia 1,356 14,287 10.5 
- with Malaysia 1,560 16,399 10.5 
- with Philippines 670 12,613 18.8 
- with Thailand 2,387 36,354 15.2 
- with Viet Nam 684 8,249 12.1 
Source: Thomson, InCites 2012 
Note: Singapore data 2000-2011 is 4,718 publications, and 73,414 citations (15.6 citations 
per publication). Citation rates for Indonesia are 7.67, Malaysia 4.40, Philippines 8.25, 
Thailand 7.02, Viet Nam 6.98. [Singapore’s citation rate is 8.49.] (UNESCO 2010: 444).  
For ASEAN, too, China is an important knowledge partner. Substantial student flows 
between China, Malaysia and Singapore are paralleled by significant Chinese diasporas 
in both (Welch 2011a and b). China’s southern borderland provinces and autonomous 
regions have long-established relations with neighbouring ASEAN member states such as 
Viet Nam and Myanmar, including developed knowledge relations (Welch 2012b, c and 
d, 2015). China is Malaysia’s largest international collaborator, while for the Philippines, 
China is the third-largest knowledge partner (UNESCO 2010: 443). For both Indonesia 
and Singapore, Australia is their third-largest international collaborator. Clearly, there is 
more potential here to develop these existing collaborations into a more fully-fledged 
regional knowledge network3.   
CONCLUSION 
Regrettably, when the Australian gaze is directed at SE Asian higher education systems, 
it is still largely as a source of international students. An index of Australia’s overly 
entrepreneurial approach to international higher education, especially compared to western 
Europe, for example, such an approach is at best myopic, and at worst a vestige of 
colonialism (Altbach and Welch 2010, Welch 2012a).  
This is all the more so in an era of network science, when, for example, as a recent Royal 
Society investigation underlined, “today, less than 26% of papers are the product of one 
institution alone, and over a third have multiple nationalities sharing authorship”, and 
when over the period 1986-2008, the proportion of the world’s published papers with more 
than one international author rose from just over 25 per cent to over 35 per cent (Royal 
Society 2011: 46). Other benefits reveal that “ For each international author on an article, 
there is a corresponding increase in the impact of that paper, up to a tipping point of around 
10” (Royal Society 2011: 59, including figure 2.7). Moreover, growing regionalism is 
cementing research relations between states within ASEAN (Royal Society 2011: 54-55), 
                                                 
3 The term knowledge network is preferred throughout, to the more common knowledge 
economy, for reasons indicated in the initial quote from Lee, Kuan Yew.  
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and enhancing prospects for greater collaboration with neighbours such as China and 
Australia (Welch 2012c, Royal Society 2011: 55). As well, initiatives such as the 
International Science, Technology and Innovation Centre for South–South Co-operation 
(ISTIC) established in 2008 with support from UNESCO and the Malaysian Government, 
and based in Kuala Lumpur, have a significant regional dimension (Royal Society 2011: 
54).   
Despite this, the potential to deepen and extend ASEAN-Australia relations in (higher) 
education, while great, remains largely unexplored, as a recent article by a well-known 
analyst of ASEAN regionalism highlighted (Jayasuriya 2013). The narrow Australian 
focus on promotion of ASEAN/Asia literacy, while important, fails to embrace a wider 
range of options. In particular, given the common ASEAN member-state strategy of 
developing at least a top tier of world-class universities, it is now increasingly possible to 
envisage much more comprehensive regional research collaboration, with ASEAN and 
Australia researchers combining to produce a result greater than the sum of the parts. The 
data above show both that significant collaboration already exists, and that significant 
potential exists to extend this. Singapore already has world-class research teams, while 
other ASEAN states have, to varying degrees, centres of excellence and valuable local 
knowledge. Such trans-national collaboration would produce substantial public-good 
results, with challenges such as climate change, non-communicable disease, and 
migration, being common challenges. With some effort, academic mobility could be 
enhanced (beyond the existing modest University Mobility in Asia and the Pacific 
[UMAP] scheme), to promote greater regional researcher mobility. Expanding parity of 
treatment by leading regional researchers in relation to Australian Research Council 
(ARC) and National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) Grants, could also 
help build capacity in selected ASEAN universities. Lastly, Jayasuriya proposes ‘…a more 
comprehensive and region-wide framework for research cooperation and funding’ 
something which again could help address common research programme needs, while at 
the same time building ‘regional public goods’ (Jayasuriya 2013).   
The question of just what is encompassed by region is significant here; all the more so, 
since China is now Australia’s leading knowledge partner, especially in fields such as 
Engineering, Mathematics and Chemistry. Of some 885 agreements between Australian 
and Chinese universities, 89 per cent included academic or research collaboration 
(DSIIRTE 2011, Yang 2008, Chief Scientist 2013), while ASEAN, too, has well-
developed academic links with China (Welch 2007, 2011b, 2012c). Indeed the 
understanding of ASEAN as a region has been problematised recently, with recent work 
raising the prospect of an ASEAN-China academic region (Jayasuriya 2004, Welch 
2012d). The prospect of even greater research synergies between ASEAN, Australia and 
China, could confer even greater rewards, particularly given the substantial number of 
Australian alumni now in key posts throughout the region.    
 
This is not to underestimate, nor ignore, the impact on international relations of complex, 
ongoing international tensions between ASEAN and China, including maritime disputes 
over the South China Sea (Sutter 2012, Welch 2012c, Lee 2015, Dewar n.d.). Nor the 
sharp deterioration in relations between Australia and Indonesia in late 2013, precipitated 
by revelations that that agents of the former had spied on senior government officials of 
the latter. Nor Australia’s delicate task of navigating between China and the USA, and the 
impact of this on its deepening relations with China (Australian 2013c and d, White 2010). 
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At the same time, however, international relations are not uni-dimensional, and there is 
no reason that cultural and academic relations should not mature, despite such obstacles 
(Australian 2013e). Harvesting such results remains unlikely, however, until Australia 
develops and sustains a mature and sophisticated, long-term, bi-partisan regional 
integration strategy. The increasingly negative, partisan, and short-term horizon of 
Australian politics and policy-making militates against the development and 
implementation of long-term regional integration policy, underpinned by sustained 
programme resources. The waxing and waning of related programmes and policies, 
including the recent politicisation of migration and refugee policy, only inhibits the 
development of effective long term strategies, in collaboration with ASEAN and possibly 
other neighbours, to fully exploit the potential of education and research cooperation.  
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